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Abstract
Is there an economic rationale for pronatalist policies? We propose and analyze
a particular market failure that leads to inefﬁciently low fertility in equilibrium.
The friction is caused by the lack of ownership of children: if parents have no
claim on their children’s income, the private beneﬁt from producing a child can
be smaller than the social beneﬁt. We analyze an overlapping-generations model
with fertility choice and parental altruism. Ownership is modeled as a minimum
constraint on transfers from parents to children. Using the efﬁciency concepts pro-
posed in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007), we ﬁnd that whenever the transfer ﬂoor
is binding, fertility choices are inefﬁcient. Second, we show that the usual condi-
tions for efﬁciency are not sufﬁcient in this context. Third, in contrast to settings
with exogenous fertility, a PAYG social security system cannot be used to imple-
ment efﬁcient allocations. To achieve an efﬁcient outcome, government transfers
need to be tied to fertility choice.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D6, E1, H55, J13
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edged.1 Introduction
In many European countries current birth rates are well below replacement levels, e.g.,
as low as 1.4 in Germany or 1.3 in Italy. Governments in those countries appear con-
cerned that fertility is “too low”, and are discussing several pronatalist policies.1 To
some extent, these policies have already been implemented in various countries. For
example, French parents receive generous subsidies for each child. Some Italian vil-
lages have experimented with generous one-time payments for the birth of a child.2
In this paper we ask in what sense fertility may be “too low” and explore the en-
suing economic rationale for pronatalist policies. The friction we investigate is related
to ownership over children.3 The basic observation is that children are a resource for
society. In particular, they increase the total labor endowment in the future. Property
rights over this resource affect incentives. If labor income belongs to children rather
than parents, then the private beneﬁt (to parents) of producing children may be smaller
than the social beneﬁt and hence fertility may be inefﬁciently low.4
To understand the main mechanism, consider the following simple example. Peo-
ple live for two periods but are endowed with labor only when young. Suppose people
derive utility from consumption but not from children. Further assume that parents
have no access to their children’s resources. Then, with a positive cost of bearing chil-
dren, equilibrium fertility will be zero. However, as long as labor is an essential input
into production, this means output when those initial people are old will also be zero.
That is, old people will be miserable. They would like to have workers around to pro-
duce consumption goods and in fact this would be feasible. But there is no incentive
for anyone to produce such workers. Instead, assume now that parents have a claim
on their children’s income. Then, as long as the claim is large enough relative to the
cost of bearing children, people will indeed have children. Output in the second pe-
riod will then be positive and everyone is better off. One could argue that children are
no worse off either, since in the former scenario they are not even alive.
1See for example “Europe, East and West, wrestles with falling birthrates—Long decline threatening
economy,” International Herald Tribune (September 3, 2006) and “Europe: The fertility bust, Charle-
magne” The Economist, February 11, 2006.
2See “European nations offer incentives to have kids”, San Francisco Chronicle, Elizabeth Bryant,
August 10, 2008; “Where have all the bambini gone?”, Telegraph, April 18, 2004.
3In this paper we use the words “child” and “offspring” as synonyms.
4Other inefﬁciencies relating to fertility are addressed in Pitchford (1985), Nerlove, Razin, and Sadka
(1985, Oct., 1986), Lee and Miller (1990), Bruce and Waldman (1990), Harford (1998), Zhang and Zhang
(2007). These papers concentrate on strategic considerations and a variety of externalities such as pollu-
tion.
1In this example, increasing fertility by shifting property rights from children to par-
ents seems to be a Pareto improvement. However, Pareto efﬁciency is not well-deﬁned
in models with endogenous populations.5 We therefore use the concepts of A− and
P−efﬁciency proposed by Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007) which allow for such com-
parisons. A feasible allocation is A−efﬁcient if there is no other feasible allocation
such that no one alive in both allocations is worse off and at least one person alive in
both allocations is strictly better off. The deﬁnition of P−efﬁciency is similar, except that
all potential people, including the unborn, are considered. In the example, the equi-
librium allocation where parents have some property rights over children’s income
A−dominates the allocation where parents don’t have any property rights. With an
additional assumption on the utility of not being born, it also P−dominates. Note that
the dominating allocation involves more people.
The above example is clearly an extreme one. Most models of fertility choice view
children as a consumption good,6 a utility function in the case of parental altruism7 or
both.8 This paper argues that the basic problem, namely misaligned property rights
leading to inefﬁciently low fertility, is present also in these more general settings. Since
property rights over children vary substantially across countries and have changed
dramatically over time (from parents towards children in most countries), analyzing
the implications seems important.9
The model we use isan inﬁnite horizon overlapping-generations (OLG) modelwith
fertility choice and parental altruism. We formalize the idea of property rights by in-
troducing a constraint that sets a minimal transfer from parents to children. This for-
mulation allows us to cover the full range of possible property rights, from parents
fully owning children’s labor income (when large negative transfers are allowed) to a
situation where children have a legal claim on their parent’s income (a positive mini-
mal transfer). When property rights are more tilted towards children, the constraint is
more likely to bind.10
5Of course, one can ask if, holding population size constant, a Pareto-dominating allocation exists.
However, such analysis yields no answer to the question whether equilibrium fertility is inefﬁciently
high or low.
6e.g. Becker (1960), Eckstein and Wolpin (1985), Conde-Ruiz, Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas (2010), etc.
7e.g. Barro (1974), Carmichael (1982), Burbidge (1983), etc.
8e.g., Razin and Ben-Zion (1975), Pazner and Razin (1980), Becker and Barro (1986, 1988), Barro and
Becker (1989), etc.
9We document different laws related to child ownership in Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2010).
10Even though in the formal model we focus on property rights over the labor endowment, our con-
clusions hold more generally. For example, if parents and children disagree about other aspects of a
child’s life, then who owns the right to make decisions will affect fertility choices and efﬁciency.
2This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we show that when
parents do not have enough property rights, equilibrium fertility will be inefﬁciently
low. More speciﬁcally, we prove that an equilibrium allocation is A− and P−efﬁcient
if and only if parents are not transfer constrained. Whenever the transfer constraint is
binding, we show how an A− and P−dominating allocation can be constructed that
involves more people. Therefore, this inefﬁciency provides a potential rationale for
government intervention aimed to increase fertility.
Second, we revisit the literature on efﬁciency in OLG models. Our set-up general-
izes the basic OLG model along two dimensions: it allows for parental altruism and
for endogenous fertility choice. Table 1 classiﬁes the literature along these two dimen-
sions. First, we show that with endogenous fertility and parental altruism, the usual
steady-state conditions for efﬁciency are not sufﬁcient for A−efﬁciency. For example,
the condition for dynamic efﬁciency, that the interest rate must be above the popula-
tion growth rate, is not sufﬁcient for A−efﬁciency. The reason is that in addition to
over-accumulation of capital, under-accumulation of people (i.e. labor) can also be a
problem. Second, an important dimension that has been neglected in the literature is
how the allocation of property rights determines whether equilibrium allocations are
efﬁcient. In fact, non-altruistic models assume that every generation owns their labor
income, while altruistic models often assume that parameters are such that transfer
constraints are not binding (i.e. parents have “enough” property right). We show that
it is precisely the combination of property rights and altruism that is important for
efﬁciency. This ﬁnding is not speciﬁc to A−efﬁciency. Property rights matter for equi-
librium efﬁciency also when more conventional efﬁciency concepts are used. In partic-
ular, we show how the thresholds of property rights beyond which different types of
inefﬁciencies occur depends on the degree of altruism.
Our third contribution concerns policy implications. We show that, in contrast to
OLG models with exogenous fertility, a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system cannot be used
to implement A−efﬁcient allocations. Even if the pension system is such that the trans-
fer constraint is not binding, the resulting equilibrium is typically not A−efﬁcient. The
reason is that, when choosing fertility, parents do not take into account that they are
also producing future contributors to the pension system. Thus, the costs and beneﬁts
of having children are not aligned in a normal PAYG system. An alternative policy—
a fertility dependent PAYG system—on the other hand, can be used to implement an
A−efﬁcient allocation. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the same allocation can also be im-
3Table 1: Literature Comparison
exogenous endogenous
fertility fertility
without
altruism
Samuelson (1958),
Cass (1972),
Balasko and Shell (1980)
Eckstein and Wolpin (1985),
Abio, Mahieu, and Patxot (2004),
Lang (2005),
Michel and Wigniolle (2007, 2009),
Conde-Ruiz, Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas (2010)
with
altruism
Barro (1974),
Burbidge (1983)
Razin and Ben-Zion (1975),
Pazner and Razin (1980),
This Paper
plemented through birth subsidies ﬁnanced by government debt and taxes.11 This pro-
vides a potential rationale for currently observed government policies that subsidize
children.
The idea that parents’ inability to access a child’s future income may lead to in-
efﬁciencies has been explored in several other contexts. In particular, several models
with exogenous fertility look at the importance of this margin for education decisions.
What we call property rights assigned to the child, is sometimes called “borrowing
constraints” or “incomplete markets” in the literature. For example, Aiyagari, Green-
wood, and Seshadri (2002) analyze the implications of borrowing constraints for the
efﬁciency of investments in children in a model where fertility is exogenous. Similarly,
Fern´ andez and Rogerson (2001) analyze the implications of borrowing constraints for
child schooling decisions and long-run inequality in a set-up with exogenous (but
stochastic) fertility.12 Also, Boldrin and Montes (2005) analyze a model where young
adults make their own schooling decisions but are borrowing-constrained leading to
an inefﬁciently low level of schooling. There is an important distinction, however,
between the inefﬁciency in education and fertility choices. The cost and beneﬁts of
investing in human capital could, in principle, be borne by the same person. For ex-
ample, if children made their own education investment decisions and markets were
complete, then there would be no friction. The same is not possible in the context of
fertility decisions since it is not technologically feasible for a child to bear the costs of
producing itself.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formalize the
11For related optimal fertility policies in different setups, see Cigno (1983, 1986, 1992).
12See also Lazear (1983).
4example above to illustrate the basic friction and how it relates to property rights. Sec-
tion 3 presents the model and characterizes equilibria. In Section 4 we analyze the
efﬁciency properties of equilibrium fertility. Section 5 explores several government
policies and Section 6 concludes.
2 An Example
We start with a simple example to illustrate that when children have full property
rights over themselves, fertility may be too low in the sense that increasing fertility
makes everyone better off.
Assume that there are two periods and two generations: parents and, potentially,
children. There is a continuum of measure one of identical parents who live for two
periods. The utility function of a parent is ln(cm) + β ln(co), where cm is consumption
when middle-aged and co is the parent’s consumption when old. Each parent is en-
dowed with wm units of the consumption good when middle-aged. Parents can save
for old age, s, and choose fertility, n. It costs θ units of the consumption good to pro-
duce a child. Children, if born, are adults in period two, endowed with one unit of
labor, and only value own consumption, ck. The production function in the second
period is Y = KαL1−α and we assume full depreciation of the capital stock. Assuming
perfect competition, factors (labor and capital) earn their marginal products. Savings
are invested as capital so that market clearing requires s = K. Labor market clearing
requires L = n.
Now suppose parents have no control over their children’s actions, more speciﬁ-
cally, over their children’s income. We label this case as children fully owning them-
selves. Then, in equilibrium, no individual parent will have an incentive to have chil-
dren. The reason is that having children is costly, and that they provide no beneﬁt to
their parents. Given that no children are born, there is no labor force in period two and
hence output is zero as well. The return on savings is zero, and parent’s consumption
in period two must be zero. Note that, since every parent is inﬁnitesimal, individ-
ual fertility choices, n, do not change aggregate labor supply and hence do not affect
prices.
On the other hand, if parents had property rights over part of their children’s
wages, say an amount ω, then there is an incentive to have children. From a parents
perspective there are two investment goods. The return to savings is r, while the return
5to children is
ω
θ. In equilibrium the interest rate will adjust such that the no-arbitrage
condition between both investments holds. In this case parents are clearly better off as
utility is logarithmic and they have positive consumption in period 2. As long as the
children’s utility from consuming wk −ω is larger than the utility from not being born,
children also beneﬁt from parents having property rights over part of their children’s
income.
The reason why equilibrium fertility may be too low depending on the allocation of
property rights is a missing market. There is no market for private contracts between
parents and children where children promise to compensate parents for child-bearing
expenses. Clearly, unborn people cannot write such contracts with their parents, but
once they are born children have no incentive to sign such a contract. Knowing this,
parents don’t bear the children in the ﬁrst place. This missing market problem is over-
come by assigning parents property rights over part of their children’s income.
The above example in which there is no utility beneﬁt from children is clearly an
extreme one. Most models of fertility choice view children as a consumption good (e.g.
Becker (1960), Eckstein and Wolpin (1985), Conde-Ruiz, Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas
(2010)), a utility function in the case of parental altruism (e.g. Barro (1974), Carmichael
(1982), Burbidge (1983)) or both (e.g., Razin and Ben-Zion (1975), Pazner and Razin
(1980), Becker and Barro (1986, 1988), Barro and Becker (1989)). However, as we will
show throughout this paper, the basic problem (misaligned property rights leading to
inefﬁciently low fertility) is very general and not an artifact of this stark example.
Finally, note that even though in this example, shifting property rights from chil-
dren to parents seems to be a Pareto improvement, Pareto efﬁciency is not well-deﬁned
in models with endogenous fertility. Instead, we use A− and P−efﬁciency, ﬁrst pro-
posed by Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007), for which we will provide formal deﬁni-
tions in Section 4.
3 The Model
We now set up our model of fertility choice with altruistic parents. The model encom-
passes the dynastic endogenous fertility models ﬁrst developed in Razin and Ben-Zion
(1975) (where utility is separable in number and utility of children) as well as those
in Becker and Barro (1986, 1988) and Barro and Becker (1989) (where utility from the
number of children and children’s utility is multiplicative), though extended to two-
6periods of adult life. In contrast to the existing literature, we explicitly introduce own-
ership over children. Speciﬁcally, we focus on property rights over adult children’s
labor income.
First, we characterize equilibria in general. In the next section we derive efﬁciency
results and compare them to those in other OLG models.
3.1 Model Setup
People live for three periods: childhood, (middle-aged) adulthood and retirement. In
childhood, nodecisionsaremade. Middle-agedadultswork andbearchildren. Retired
peopleliveofftheirsavingsandpotentiallytransfers from theirchildren.13 Households
derive utility from their own consumption when middle-aged, cm
t , and when old, co
t+1,
the number of children, nt, as well as their offsprings’ average utility. That is, in our
model children are a consumption good in that nt directly enters the utility function,
but parents are also altruistic and care about their children’s utility.
The utility of a middle-aged household in period t (born in t − 1) is given by:
Ut = u(c
m
t ) + βu(c
o
t+1) + V
￿
nt,
R nt
0 Ui
t+1di
nt
￿
(1)
We assume that u(·) is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave and u0(0) = ∞.
Discounting between periods is given by β. Later, we introduce speciﬁc functional
forms for V . For now, we assume that V is strictly increasing and strictly concave in
fertility, nt, and weakly increasing in the average utility of children.
The budget constraints are given by
c
m
t + θtnt + st+1 ≤ wt(1 + bt)
c
o
t+1 +
Z nt
0
b
i
t+1wt+1di ≤ rt+1st+1
b
i
t+1 ≥ bt+1
c
m
t ,c
o
t+1,nt ≥ 0
(2)
where st+1 are savings, bi
t+1wt+1 is the transfer from parent to child i if positive, from
child i to the parent if negative, and θt is the cost per child.14
13We introduce government transfers in Section 5.
14For example, θt = a
g
t + (ac
t − κt)wt with a
g
t the goods cost of children, ac
t is the fraction of time that
has to be spent with every child in raising it and κt is the amount of (effective) labor the parent can
7The minimum constraint, bt+1, can be interpreted as parental property rights over
children’s labor income.15 When bt+1 is positive, then a larger transfer ﬂoor implies
that parents have to bequeath more resources to their children. When bt+1 is nega-
tive, a higher transfer ﬂoor means parents can expropriate fewer resources from their
children. The transfer ﬂoor is only well-deﬁned between -1 and some b
max. When
bt+1 = −1 then there are no (legal or effective) constraints on transfers and parents have
full property rights over their children’s income. If, on the other hand, bt+1 = 0 then
children own their labor income. If bt+1 > 0 then children have a claim to their parent’s
income. The maximum possible transfer, b
max
t+1 , depends on endogenous variables. At
b
max
t+1 a parent would save his entire income and leave it to his children. A closed form
expression for bmax as a function of parameters is derived for speciﬁc functional forms
in Appendix A.3.
Initially, there is a mass 1 of initial old people each endowed with K0 capital and
n−1 children. The initial old chooses (co
0,{bi
0}
n−1
i=0) to maximize
U−1 = βu(c
o
0) + V
￿
n−1,
R n−1
0 Ui
0di
n−1
￿
subject to:
c
o
0 +
Z n−1
0
b
i
0w0di ≤ r0K0, b
i
0 ≥ b0
The middle-aged adult in period t chooses (cm
t ,co
t+1,nt,st+1,{bi
t+1}
nt
i=0) to maximize
Ut in equation (1) subject to the constraints in (2), given bt, the transfer from his own
parents and prices (wt,wt+1,rt+1), taking the behavior of all descendants as given.
Since u(.) is strictly concave and there is no heterogeneity among children, it is
always best for the parent to give the same transfer to each child, bi
t+1 = bt+1,∀i. Hence,
we can rewrite the utility as:
Ut = u(c
m
t ) + βu(c
o
t+1) + V (nt,Ut+1) (3)
extract from the child. For example, if a period is 20 years and children can work from age 10 and are
half as productive as an adult, then κt ≈ 0.25. Below we concentrate on parents’ property rights over
adult children but a change in κt could reﬂect changes in child-labor laws, for example.
15Specifying transfers as absolute amounts rather than proportional to the wage leads to the same
qualitative results. This is because, though chosen by the parent, both types of transfers are lump-sum
to the child since labor supply in perfectly inelastic.
8and the budget constraint when old as:
c
o
t+1 + ntbt+1wt+1 ≤ rt+1st+1
As can be seen, the constraint set is not convex in general. This is because n mul-
tiplies b in the budget constraint when old and both are choice variables. Therefore,
the ﬁrst-order conditions of this problem, while necessary, are not sufﬁcient for an
optimum. Instead of using second-order conditions to characterize the solution, one
way to circumvent this problem is to follow Alvarez (1999) and to write the utility and
constraints in terms of dynasty aggregates. See Appendix A.1 for details.
The representative ﬁrm has a neo-classical production function Yt = F(Kt,Lt), and
takes prices (rt,wt) as given when choosing (Kt,Lt) to maximize proﬁts. For simplicity,
we assume full depreciation throughout.
Next, markets clear. Labor markets clear in period t if the ﬁrm’s labor demand per
old person, Lt, is equal to the number of middle-aged people per old person, nt−1,
since they are the only ones who are productive and labor is supplied inelastically. The
capital stock per old person, Kt, must be equal to savings from currently old people, st.
Hence, factor markets clear if Lt = nt−1 and Kt = st. Goods market clearing in period
t, expressed in per old person terms, is:
c
o
t + nt−1(c
m
t + θtnt + st+1) = Yt.
Finally, feasibility per old person is given by:
c
o
t + nt−1(c
m
t + θtnt + Kt+1) = F(Kt,Lt). (4)
3.2 Characterizing equilibria
Let Vn and VU denote the derivative of V with respect to its ﬁrst and second argument,
respectively. Letλb,t+1 be the Lagrange multiplieron the transfer constraint, bi
t+1 ≥ bt+1,
in (2). The ﬁrst-order conditions for the household problem are
u
0(c
m
t ) = βu
0(c
o
t+1)rt+1, (5)
Vn(nt,Ut+1) = u
0(c
m
t )θt + βu
0(c
o
t+1)bt+1wt+1, (6)
βu
0(c
o
t+1)nt = VU(nt,Ut+1)u
0(c
m
t+1) +
λb,t+1
wt+1
, (7)
9together with the budget constraints when middle-aged and when old. The ﬁrst two
equations are intertemporal conditions equating marginal costs and beneﬁts of savings
and fertility. The third condition is an intratemporal but intergenerational condition,
equating the parent’s marginal cost and beneﬁt of an additional unit of transfer per
child, bt+1, unless the minimum constraint is binding.
Denoting kt the capital stock per worker, the ﬁrst-order conditions for the ﬁrm’s
problem are given by
wt = FL(kt,1), (8)
rt = FK(kt,1). (9)
If bt = −1, ∀t and VU > 0, then λb,t = 0, ∀t and we denote the equilibrium allocation
by {cm∗
t ,co∗
t+1,n∗
t,s∗
t+1,k∗
t,b∗
t+1}∞
t=0 and prices by {w∗
t,r∗
t}∞
t=0. We denote any equilibrium
allocation forthecasewheresomegeneration isconstrained by{ˆ cm
t ,ˆ co
t+1, ˆ nt, ˆ st+1,ˆ kt,ˆ bt+1}∞
t=0
and prices by { ˆ wt, ˆ rt}∞
t=0.
The state variable in this economy is the capital-labor ratio, Kt+1/nt. Since capital
depreciates fully across generations, parents are free to choose the capital-labor ratio
optimally, given their constraints. Therefore, if both bt and θt are constant, then the
economy is in a steady state as of period 1, i.e., there are no transitional dynamics.
3.3 Utility Speciﬁcations
To facilitate a comparison with the literature, we sometimes make functional form as-
sumptions for the utility function. However, these assumptions are not needed for
most of our results.
We look at two alternative speciﬁcations for V . First, we consider the Razin-Ben-
Zion (RB) speciﬁcation given by:
V (nt,Ut+1) = γu(nt) + ζUt+1 (10)
Second, we consider Barro-Becker type altruism (BB) given by16
V (nt,Ut+1) = ζg(nt)Ut+1 (11)
16Note that, while we assume BB−type altruism, the model here is an extension of the original BB
model due to the second period of adult life. We are not the ﬁrst to consider this extension, however, see
for example Zhang and Zhang (2007).
10Sequentially substituting utility functions from period s to ∞, we get:
RB Us =
∞ X
t=s
ζ
t−s ￿
u(c
m
t ) + βu(c
o
t+1) + γu(nt)
￿
,
BB Us =
∞ X
t=s
ζ
t−sg(N
m
s,t)
￿
u(c
m
t ) + βu(c
o
t+1)
￿
(12)
where, Nm
s,t is the number of middle age descendants of generation s in period t.
Note that there is a special case in which the BB speciﬁcation and the RB speciﬁca-
tion coincide (this requires logarithmic utility and a speciﬁc functional form for g(·).17
In general, however, neither of the two speciﬁcations is a special case of the other. The
RB utility function is particularly useful when comparing our results to results in non-
altruistic models with endogenous fertility: simply let ζ → 0. The BB−utility function
is richer in that it allows for complementarity or substitutability between the number
and utility of children.18
4 Property Rights and Efﬁciency
In this section we analyze the efﬁciency properties of equilibria in our model. Analyz-
ing normative questions in models with endogenous fertility requires taking a stand
on the appropriate concept of efﬁciency. The problem is that Pareto efﬁciency is not
a well-deﬁned concept in models with endogenous populations. One might still ask
whether a given allocation is Pareto efﬁcient, i.e., whether, holding population size
constant, a dominating allocation exists. However, this kind of analysis cannot address
the question whether equilibrium fertility is too low. We use alternative concepts, A−
and P−efﬁciency, ﬁrst proposed by Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007), which are very
close to Pareto efﬁciency but allow us to compare allocations with different population
sizes.19
We start this section by deﬁning the concepts. We then prove our main result,
namelythatequilibriumallocations areA−andP−efﬁcient ifandonlyiftheconstraint
is not binding. We then provide necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for efﬁciency and
17Details on the necessary utility transformations that lead to this result are available upon request.
18See Appendix A.1.1 for details.
19In the context of models without altruism, some authors have used an alternative concept, Millian
efﬁciency (M−efﬁciency), which requires potentially dominating allocations to be symmetric across all
people within a given generation. We discuss this concept in Section 4.2.
11compare them to the previous literature on efﬁciency in OLG models. In this context,
we demonstrate the importance of the allocation of property rights and its interaction
with altruism.
4.1 A− and P−efﬁciency of competitive equilibrium allocations
We use the efﬁciency-concepts suggested in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007), A− and
P−efﬁciency. We brieﬂy provide the deﬁnitions here and refer the reader to Golosov,
Jones, and Tertilt (2007) for details.
Let P be the set of potential people. An allocation z = {zi
t}(t,i)∈P is a vector of all
goods (including children or people in general) over which person i of generation t’s
utility is deﬁned, zi
t, for all potential people. Let A be the set of all possible allocations.
Further, let Ai
t be the set of all allocations in which person i of generation t is born. To
deﬁne A−efﬁciency, the following assumption is needed:
Assumption 1 For each (t,i) ∈ P, there is a well deﬁned, real-valued utility function
Ui
t : Ai
t → R.
Deﬁnition 2 A feasible allocation z = {zi
t}(t,i) is A−efﬁcient if there is no other feasible allo-
cation ˜ z such that
1. Ui
t(˜ z) ≥ Ui
t(z) ∀(t,i) alive in both allocations;
2. Ui
t(˜ z) > Ui
t(z) for some (t,i) alive in both allocations.
A−efﬁciency is a natural extension of Pareto efﬁciency to environments in which the
number of people is endogenous. It also has the advantage of not requiring people
who are not alive to have preferences. What the concept does is a pairwise comparison
of allocations with a focus only on those people who are alive. If someone isn’t born
in a particular allocation, this person has no “say” in the utility comparison. Alterna-
tively, if one is willing to deﬁne utility even for people who are not alive, then another
logical extension of Pareto efﬁciency is a concept where every potential person gets a
“say,” which is termed P−efﬁciency by Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007). To deﬁne
P−efﬁciency, the following assumption is needed:
Assumption 3 For each (t,i) ∈ P, there is a well deﬁned, real-valued utility function
Ui
t : A → R.
12Deﬁnition 4 A feasible allocation z = {zi
t}(t,i) is P−efﬁcient if there is no other feasible allo-
cation ˜ z such that
1. Ui
t(˜ z) ≥ Ui
t(z) for all (t,i) ∈ P;
2. Ui
t(˜ z) > Ui
t(z)) for at least one (t,i) ∈ P.
Throughout the paper whenever we talk about P−efﬁciency, we also assume that be-
ing alive is always preferred to not being born. For all other concepts, this assumption
is irrelevant.
Assumption 5 Ui
t(˜ z) < Ui
t(z) for all ˜ z in which (t,i) is not born and z in which (t,i) is born.
As shown in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007), under relatively mild assumptions,
the set of A−efﬁcient allocations is a subset of the set of P−efﬁcient allocations. The
reason is that there are more ways of A−dominating an allocation because it is allowed
to “ignore” people. For many applications, especially in our context here, the two
concepts give the same result.
Our ﬁrst result states that equilibria in an economy without binding transfer con-
straints are always efﬁcient. Recall that λb,t denotes the multiplier on the transfer con-
straint bt+1 ≥ bt+1.
Proposition 6 If parameters are such that λb,t = 0 for all t, then the equilibrium allocation,
z∗ ≡ {cm∗
t ,co∗
t+1,n∗
t,s∗
t+1,k∗
t,b∗
t+1}∞
t=0, is A− and P−efﬁcient.
Proof. This essentially follows from Theorem 2 in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007).
Without binding transfer constraints, the equilibrium allocation maximizes the utility
of the dynastic head, given prices. Thus, the equilibrium allocation is dynastically A−
and P−efﬁcient. This, together with the assumption of a neoclassical production func-
tion, ensures that the assumptions of Theorem 2 in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007)
are satisﬁed.
On the other hand, when there are binding constraints, then the equilibrium allo-
cation is essentially always A− and P−inefﬁcient. The only exception to this result
is when parents are not altruistic at all. If VU = 0, then a binding constraint does not
necessarily imply inefﬁciency. We will come back to this special case later. For now, we
assume that VU > 0.
Proposition 7 Assume VU > 0. If parameters are such that λb,s+1 > 0 for some generation s,
then the equilibrium allocation, ˆ z ≡ {ˆ cm
t ,ˆ co
t+1, ˆ nt, ˆ st+1,ˆ kt,ˆ bt+1}∞
t=0, is A− and P−inefﬁcient.
13Proof. Consider the following alternative allocation, ˜ z. All the people alive in ˆ z, except
individuals of generation s, receive the same as in the equilibrium allocation. That is
∀t 6= s:
˜ c
m
t = ˆ c
m
t ˜ nt = ˆ nt
˜ c
o
t+1 = ˆ c
o
t+1 ˜ st+1 = ˆ st+1
The allocation is different for the individuals from generation s alive in ˆ z. They have
￿ more children, and receive an additional transfer ∆ from each new child. More for-
mally, we have
˜ c
m
s = ˆ c
m
s − θs￿ ˜ ns = ˆ ns + ￿
˜ c
o
s+1 = ˆ c
o
s+1 + (∆ − bs+1 ˆ ws+1)￿ ˜ ss+1 = ˆ ss+1.
That is, they have ￿ more children than in the equilibrium allocation. This ￿-mass of
new people (not alive in ˆ z), receive:
˜ c
m,n
s+1 =
F(ˆ ss+1, ˜ ns) − F(ˆ ss+1, ˆ ns)
￿
− ˆ ss+2 − θs+1ˆ ns+1 + b − ∆
˜ c
o,n
s+1 = ˆ c
o
s+1 ˜ n
n
s+1 = ˆ ns+1 ˜ s
n
s+2 = ˆ ss+2
That is, the additional people get an equal fraction of the extra output they produce
and they give
￿
∆ − bs+1 ˆ ws+1
￿
each to their parents in period s+1—that is, they give ∆
more to their parents than their siblings. Note that VU > 0 together with strict concav-
ity of u(c) guarantees that ˆ cs+1 > 0 which assures that ∆ > 0 is possible. The additional
people do, however, have the same fertility, savings, and consumption when old as
their siblings. Since production is expressed in per old person terms, we give the de-
scendants of the ￿−mass of newpeople the same allocation as other individuals in their
generation.
First, note that feasibility (equation 4) of the alternative allocation is satisﬁed by
construction.
Second, we show that, for small ￿ and ∆, the alternative allocation is A−superior
to the equilibrium allocation. To do this, for people alive in ˆ z, deﬁne ˜ Ut to be the
utility ofgeneration tunderthenewallocation and ˆ Ut underthe equilibriumallocation,
respectively. Then, it is easy to see that ˜ Ut = ˆ Ut for all t > s. Further, for the ￿-mass of
14new people, we have:
˜ U
n
s+1(￿,∆) = ˆ Us+1 − u(ˆ c
m
s+1) + u(˜ c
m,n
s+1)
For generation s, we have:
˜ Us(￿,∆) = u(˜ c
m
s ) + βu(˜ c
o
s+1) + V
 
˜ ns,
ˆ ns ˜ Us+1 + ￿˜ Un
s+1(￿,∆)
ˆ ns + ￿
!
Using the the deﬁnition of ˜ z, this is equal to
˜ Us(￿,∆) = u(˜ c
m
s ) + βu(˜ c
o
s+1) + V
￿
˜ ns,
￿[u(˜ c
m,n
s+1) − u(ˆ cm
s+1)]
ˆ ns + ￿
+ ˆ Us+1
￿
Taking the derivative with respect to ￿ and evaluating the expression at ￿ = 0, we have
∂ ˜ Us(￿,∆)
∂￿
￿
￿
￿=0 = − θu
0(ˆ c
m
s ) + βu
0(ˆ c
o
s+1)[∆ − bs+1 ˆ ws+1]
+ Vn
￿
ˆ ns, ˆ Us+1
￿
+ VU
￿
ˆ ns, ˆ Us+1
￿ [u(ˆ cm
s+1 − ∆) − u(ˆ cm
s+1)]
ˆ ns
Using equation (6), this reduces to
∂ ˜ Us(￿,∆)
∂￿
￿
￿
￿=0 = βu
0(ˆ c
o
s+1)∆ + VU
￿
ˆ ns, ˆ Us+1
￿ [u(ˆ cm
s+1 − ∆) − u(ˆ cm
s+1)]
ˆ ns
Note that for ∆ = 0, this expression is zero. So all that is left to show is that for a
small increase in ∆, the expression increases. Taking derivatives with respect to ∆ and
evaluating at ∆ = 0, we have:
∂ ˜ Us(￿,∆)
∂￿
￿
￿
￿=0
∂∆
￿
￿
∆=0 = βu
0(ˆ c
o
s+1) − VU
￿
ˆ ns, ˆ Us+1
￿ u0(ˆ cm
s+1)
ˆ ns
By the ﬁrst order condition (7) this is equal to
λb,s+1
ˆ ws+1ˆ ns, which is strictly positive if
and only if the constraint is binding. Hence, for small positive ￿ and ∆, generation s
is strictly better off with the alternative allocation. Finally, any generation t prior to s
(t < s) has generation s as a descendant and, since VU > 0, is also strictly better off.
This completes the proof that the alternative allocation A−dominates the equilibrium
allocation.
15By Assumption 5, the new people are also strictly better off, and hence the alterna-
tive allocation also P−dominates the equilibrium allocation.
Itisworth notingthattheunconstrained equilibriumallocation, though A−efﬁcient,
isnot necessarily A−superior to the equilibrium allocation whenthe constraint isbind-
ing. This is because, apart from the initial old, every subsequent generation may be
worse off when the constraint is removed.
Propositions 6 and 7 are an interesting instance in which Coase’s theorem does not
apply: the allocation of property rights matters for the efﬁciency of the equilibrium
allocation. The reason is a missing market. Essentially, the market for private con-
tracts between parents and children where children promise to compensate parents for
child-bearing expenses does not exist. Clearly, unborn people cannot write such con-
tracts with their parents, but once they are born children have no incentive to sign such
a contract. But without such a contract, parents have a reduced incentive to bear chil-
dren.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that having people truly overlap in their lives
is a crucial ingredient for generating inefﬁciencies. In many fertility models with altru-
ism (e.g. Barro and Becker (1989)) people consume during one period only and hence
do not overlap as adults. In our set-up, this corresponds to the special case β = 0. For
this case, equilibrium bequests are always strictly positive. If they weren’t, the capital
stock would be zero and the interest rate inﬁnite. As long as VU > 0, zero bequests can-
not be an optimal choice. For this special case then, any minimum bequest constraint
less than or equal to zero (i.e. b ≤ 0) will never be binding and therefore no inefﬁcien-
cies occur. In our more general set-up (with β > 0), parents overlap with productive
children and therefore desired transfers may well be negative. The difference is that
when generations overlap, negative bequests are perfectly consistent with a positive
capital stock.20
4.2 Necessary and Sufﬁcient Conditions for Efﬁciency
We now derive necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for efﬁciency and compare them to
the literature in Table 1.
20Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) and Pazner and Razin (1980) allow for β > 0. However, they implicitly
assume that bt = −1 for all t throughout their analysis.
164.2.1 Comparison with exogenous fertility models: interest and fertility rates
In standard OLG models (top left of Table 1) ﬁrst developed by Samuelson (1958) and
Diamond (1965), the stationary equilibrium allocation is dynamically efﬁcient if and
only if r > n. This result dates back to Phelps (1965) and Diamond (1965).21 Adding
altruism (bottom left of Table 1), the condition r > n is still necessary and sufﬁcient
for Pareto efﬁciency (see Barro (1974) for n = 1 and Burbidge (1983) for n 6= 1). Note
that the case where fertility is given exogenously is a special case of our model. In
our model, u(n) (for the RB speciﬁcation) or g(n) (for the BB speciﬁcation) are simply
additive ormultiplicative constants inutility, while wagesnetof childcosts correspond
to wages or endowments in the standard model. Holding fertility ﬁxed, r > n is also a
necessary and sufﬁcient condition for Pareto efﬁciency in our set-up. To see this, let us
ﬁrst deﬁne Pareto efﬁciency for completeness:
Deﬁnition 8 A feasible allocation z = {zi
t}(t,i) is Pareto efﬁcient if there is no other feasible
allocation ˜ z with the same set of people alive such that
1. Ui
t(˜ z) ≥ Ui
t(z) ∀(t,i);
2. Ui
t(˜ z) > Ui
t(z) for some (t,i).
Lemma 9 Assume RB or BB. A stationary equilibrium allocation is Pareto efﬁcient if and
only if r > n.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.
However, when fertility is allowed to change, then the condition needs to be modiﬁed
as follows.
Proposition 10 Assume RB or BB with ζ > 0. A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a
stationary equilibrium allocation to be A− (and P−)efﬁcient is
RB n = ζr
BB n
ε = ζr
(13)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.2.
The condition is essentially a no-arbitrage condition between investing in savings
versus bequests. In equilibrium, the return to investing in savings is r, while the return
21See also Cass (1972) and Balasko and Shell (1980).
17to bequests depends on the utility function. Each additional unit of bequests is divided
by n children, so that—at least in the RB formulation—the return on bequests is equal
to ζ/n.
Recall that ζ < 1 is necessary for the model to be well-deﬁned. Thus, Proposition 10
immediately implies that any A−efﬁcient equilibrium allocation was characterized by
r > n in RB. More generally, suppose an unconstrained equilibrium is characterized
by r < n. Then there exists a Pareto dominating allocation where population is held
ﬁxed. Of course, the same allocation would also be A−dominating. This would con-
tradict Proposition 6. However, while necessary, the condition r > n is not sufﬁcient
for A−efﬁciency as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 11 Assume VU > 0. In a stationary equilibrium, r > n is a necessary but not
sufﬁcient condition for A−efﬁciency.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3.
The result that r > n is not a sufﬁcient condition for A−efﬁciency may have im-
portant implications. Sometimes the r > n criterion is used to assess whether a par-
ticular country is dynamically efﬁcient (e.g., Abel, Mankiw, Summers, and Zeckhauser
(1989)). This can be relevant in the context of designing social security systems, for
example. Our ﬁndings suggest that such analysis may have been based on the wrong
criterion—given that, by and large, people do choose birth rates in reality.
4.2.2 Comparison with models without altruism: wages and interest rates
Several authors have analyzed models with endogenous fertility but without altruism
(see top right of Table 1).
Without altruism, parents do not value their children’s consumption and hence
the transfer constraint is always binding. As long as the legal constraint b is not at
the feasible minimum, this means that such an equilibrium is not A−efﬁcient. The
logic is the same as in the proof of Proposition 7. The logic breaks down if the legal
constraint coincides with the feasible minimum, b = −1. For this special case, the
equilibrium is both A−efﬁcient and the constraint is binding. Note, however, that this
is a degenerate equilibrium: the initial old expropriate all income from their children,
who consequently consume zero, and no children are born. Clearly, the only stationary
equilibrium for this case is trivial: no one is alive. We summarize these results in the
next proposition.
18Proposition 12 Assume VU = 0. Then the transfer constraint is always binding.
There are two cases:
a) if b > −1, then the equilibrium is A− (and P−) inefﬁcient;
b) if b = −1, then the equilibrium is such that cm
t = co
t+1 = nt−1 = 0 for all t ≥ 1, and the
equilibrium is A− (and P−) efﬁcient.
This proposition shows that non-degenerate equilibria can never be A−efﬁcient
when parents are not altruistic. Papers without altruism therefore typically use a dif-
ferent efﬁciency concept: M−efﬁciency, which is similar to A−efﬁciency but requires
people within the same generation to be treated symmetrically (i.e. people with the
same preferences and endowment get the same consumption-fertility bundle).
Deﬁnition 13 A feasible symmetric allocation z = {zt}t is M−efﬁcient if there is no other
feasible symmetric allocation ˜ z such that
1. Ut(˜ z) ≥ Ut(z) ∀t;
2. Ut(˜ z) > Ut(z) for some t.
As shown in Section 3.1, equilibrium allocations are always symmetric in this model.
Hence, using M−efﬁciency in this environment makes sense.
Note also that the set of symmetric A−efﬁcient allocations is a subset of the set of
M−efﬁcient allocations. In particular, in our proof of Proposition 7, we constructed a
superior allocation that treated new people differently from those who are alive under
both allocations. This would not be a M−dominating allocation. In other words, by
widening the set of potentially dominating allocations, one can identify inefﬁciencies
that cannot be addressed if symmetry is imposed.
Authors using models without altruism and M−efﬁciency also ﬁnd that r > n
is not sufﬁcient for M−efﬁciency. Instead, they ﬁnd that a sufﬁcient condition for
M−efﬁciency is given by rθ > w (see Conde-Ruiz, Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas (2010),
Proposition 5 and Corollary 2, and Michel and Wigniolle (2007), Proposition 4). Again,
we ﬁnd that rθ > w is necessary, but not sufﬁcient for A−efﬁciency.
Proposition 14 Assume VU > 0. In a stationary equilibrium, rθ > w is a necessary but not
sufﬁcient condition for A−efﬁciency.
19Proof. See Appendix A.2.4.
At ﬁrst it seems intuitive that the equation rθ = w should hold with equality in
an unconstrained equilibrium: the cost of children θ needs to equal their discounted
beneﬁt w/r. However, the total beneﬁt from children is higher than their monetary
return, as they also provide a utility beneﬁt to their parents. Therefore, if rθ = w held
in equilibrium, parents would ﬁnd it more beneﬁcial to have more children and save
less. This would drive down wages and increase the interest rate.22 The reason rθ > w
is not sufﬁcient is that it does not guarantee that parents are not constrained. As we
have shown in Proposition 7, a binding constraint always implies A−inefﬁciency.
4.3 Property Rights and Efﬁciency: an Illustration
So far we have derived several necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for a steady state
equilibrium to be efﬁcient according to various efﬁciency criteria. In this section we
now illustrate the importance of property rights for equilibrium (in)efﬁciency. The
illustration shows how the tightness of the transfer constraint (higher b) is related to
the types of inefﬁciencies that occur. Figure 1 shows a stylized description of how
steady state interest, wage and fertility rates change as a function of b. The picture
shows four cases separated by three cut-offs in b. The ﬁrst cut-off is b∗, the equilibrium
bequest for the unconstrained case. The second cut-off, bM, is the b that leads to w = θr
in equilibrium. The last cut-off, bP is the b such that in equilibrium r = n holds. While
the picture is based on a particular computed example, the characterization is fairly
general.23
First, for minimum transfers below b∗, the constraint is not binding. This is be-
cause with altruism, parents want their children to consume something. In this case,
equilibria are A−efﬁcient. This is the result in Proposition 6. We know from Golosov,
Jones, and Tertilt (2007) that A−efﬁciency implies Pareto-efﬁciency (when fertility is
held constant), i.e. the allocation is dynamically efﬁcient.
Second, for b above b∗ the constraint is binding and the equilibrium allocation is
A−inefﬁcient by Proposition 7. When the constraint starts to bind, all else equal, chil-
22Only in the special case where the direct utility beneﬁt and indirect utility cost of population cancel
out, total population and aggregate capital are pure investment goods to produce aggregate consump-
tion, and the rate of return condition requires rθ = w at any A−efﬁcient allocation. See Appendix A.1
and A.2.4 for details.
23For the RB utility speciﬁcation with log utility and Cobb-Douglas production closed form solutions
for b∗, bP and bM exist (see Appendix A.3).
20Figure 1: Steady State Characterization as a Function of b
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dren become more expensive. Therefore, parents shift their resources away from chil-
dren towards savings so that in equilibrium returns to investing in children and in
capital are again equalized. This increases the capital-labor ratio causing the interest
rate to fall and the wage rate to increase. This allocation is A−inefﬁcient, since an
A−planner would choose a lower capital-labor ratio.
As b increases, in the example, w monotonically increases and r monotonically de-
creases in b.24 Therefore, as property rights shift even more towards children (b in-
creases further), eventually w ≥ rθ holds. Since w < rθ is a sufﬁcient condition for
M−efﬁciency, it follows that for intermediate values of property rights, the equilib-
rium allocation isM−efﬁcient butnot A−efﬁcient (see Proposition 14). Inother words,
between b∗ and bM it is possible to dominate the equilibrium allocation only by chang-
ing the number of people and treating people within the same generation differentially.
Beyond bM it may be possible to dominate an allocation that does not involve asym-
metries within the same generation.
24The exact nature of the relationship between marginal products and b depends on the production
and utility functions. Enough substitutability between n and K guarantees that steady state w and r are
monotone in b.
21With an even higher minimum transfer constraint, at some point the interest and
fertility rates cross. As soon as r < n, the allocation becomes Pareto inefﬁcient. If
parents are constrained enough, then equilibria are neither A− nor dynamically efﬁ-
cient. That is, if rights are heavily in favor of children such that b > bP, then there
exists a dominating allocation that does not involve changing the number of people.
In this case, people are saving too much. They are not just picking the wrong portfolio
mix (capital vs. children), but the overall level of savings is too high. A dominating
allocation can be constructed by redistributing resources across generations (holding
population size ﬁxed).
4.4 Property Rights vs. Altruism
There is a strong relationship between the assumption on altruism and (implicit) as-
sumptions on property rights that have been made in the literature. Models without
altruism (with or without endogenous fertility) typically assume that b = 0. On the
other hand, authors who use altruistic models typically assume that parents have full
property rights. They do this by either assuming that parameters are such that equi-
librium bequests are positive, or they assume two sided altruism deﬁned such that all
agents alive agree on the appropriate allocation and make intergenerational transfers
accordingly. Both of these assumptions are isomorphic to assuming that b = −1 with
one-sided altruism.
In both, the endogenous and exogenous fertility literature, the lack (or misspeciﬁca-
tion) of altruism hasbeen blamed for inefﬁciencies occurring in equilibrium.25 Proposi-
tion 7 shows that altruism is perfectly consistent with inefﬁciencies occurring in equi-
librium. In other words, it is not the presence or absence of altruism alone that is
the dividing line between equilibrium efﬁciency and inefﬁciency. Rather, inefﬁciencies
occur precisely when parents have too few property rights relative to their degree of
25See for example, Barro (1974). Also, Burbidge (1983) showed that when two-sided altruism is prop-
erly added to the standard OLG model, then the interest rate will always be larger than the population
growth rate,andhence theequilibrium allocation will alwaysbeParetoefﬁcient. This resultis derivedin
the endogenous fertility context by Pazner and Razin (1980), who also ﬁnd that equilibrium allocations
are always dynamically efﬁcient in the sense that r > n. Pazner and Razin (1980) is the only previous
paper that has used the expression “property rights” in this context. However, they analyze only the
case where parents have full property rights. There was a heated debate about these issues at the end of
the 1970’s and early 1980’s. See for example, Drazen (1978), Carmichael (1982), Buiter and Carmichael
(1984), Burbidge (1984),Abel (1987)and Laitner (1988). Moreover, Cigno and Werding (2007) (p.121and
p.125) attribute inefﬁciencies pointed out in Conde-Ruiz, Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas (2010) and Michel
and Wigniolle (2007, 2009) to the absence of altruism.
22Figure 2: The Interaction between Altruism and Property Rights
 
 
A-ineﬃcient
M-ineﬃcient
Pareto ineﬃcient
A-ineﬃcient
M-(in)eﬃcient
Pareto eﬃcient
A-ineﬃcient
M-eﬃcient
Pareto eﬃcient
A-eﬃcient
M-eﬃcient
Pareto eﬃcient
b∗
C
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
t
,
b
Altruism, ζ
bM
bP
altruism. Figure 2 illustrates this point. If altruism is high, then assigning property
rights largely to children still leads to equilibrium efﬁciency. On the other hand, when
altruism is low, then parental property rights are crucial for efﬁciency.
There are several reasons why assigning parents full property rights in altruistic
models while assigning children full rights in non-altruistic models is so prevalent in
the literature. In models with exogenous fertility and no altruism, parent-child re-
lationships are not even clearly deﬁned and hence the natural starting point is self-
ownership for each agent in the economy. Once fertility choice is added there are
well-deﬁned family relationships. However, as long as altruism is absent, parents
will always take everything they legally or feasibly can from their children. Thus, as
shown in Proposition 12, not imposing any transfer constraints implies that only par-
ents consume anything, children starve and the economy ends thereafter—not a very
interesting case. Hence, models without altruism typically assume b = 0. Models with
altruism, on the other hand, typically abstract from transfer constraints. This might
be partly due to models without constraints being easier to analyze. Also, once altru-
ism is introduced it might appear natural to let a dynastic head make all the decisions
for the dynasty.
23In sum, Figure 2 shows that it is the combination of property rights and the degree
of altruism that determines whether equilibria are efﬁcient or not.
5 Policy Implications
Given the equilibrium inefﬁciencies resulting from binding transfer constraints, the
most obvious policy recommendation would be to simply lift the constraints and give
parents full property rights over their children. However, such a policy might not be
desirable for various reasons, for example, it might open the door to child abuse. Also,
it might be very difﬁcult to enforce payments from adult children to their parents.
While these additional concerns are outside of our model, we believe it is useful to
explore to what extent alternative policies can also implement efﬁcient allocations in
equilibrium.
For example, a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system essentially provides a way of
transferring resources from the young to the old. Hence, a PAYG system may be desir-
able in societies where children have rights over their labor income. In fact, it has been
shown that a standard PAYG system can be used to implement Pareto efﬁcient alloca-
tions in OLG models with exogenous fertility. However, as we show below, the same
logic does not hold in an endogenous fertility set-up. The reason is that a PAYG system
may distort the incentives to have children. Therefore, we also examine a fertility de-
pendent PAYG pension system and fertility subsidies ﬁnanced with government debt.
In each case, we ask whether a given policy allows the implementation of A−efﬁcient
allocations.
5.1 PAYG social security
We introduce a pay-as-you-go social security system (PAYG) into the model laid out
in Section 3. First, we show that the introduction of a standard PAYG social security
system, in which children are taxed to ﬁnance lump-sum transfers to parents when old
increases the desired transfer when parents are constrained, so that for a high enough
tax, the bequest constraint is no longer binding. However, such a PAYG system can-
not be used to implement an A−efﬁcient allocation. That is, even without a binding
constraint, fertility might be inefﬁciently low in the presence of a PAYG social security
system. The reason is that when parents make fertility decisions they do not take into
account that they are increasing the number of contributors to the pension system and
24thereby implicitly their old age support.
To introduce a PAYG system, we make the following modiﬁcations to our set-up.
The government now taxes middle aged people at rate τt and gives the proceeds as a
lump-sum pension, Tt, to the old. Both the children and parents take these taxes and
pensions as given. Hence, the modiﬁed budget constraints are:
c
m
t + θtnt + st+1 ≤ wt(1 + bt − τt) (14)
c
o
t+1 + bt+1wt+1nt ≤ rt+1st+1 + Tt+1 (15)
To simplify algebra, we specify taxes proportional to wages. Note, however, that la-
bor is supplied inelastically, and therefore our speciﬁcation is equivalent to lump-sum
taxes for generation t.
A PAYG system requires the government to balance its budgetevery period. Hence,
in per old person terms, we have Tt+1 = ntτt+1wt+1. That is, the government chooses
one instrument, say τt+1, while the other, Tt+1, is determined in equilibrium by the
fertility choice of all parents. The (inﬁnitesimal) individual parent realizes that his/her
fertility choice alone will not affect the average pension and hence takes Tt+1 as given.
Otherwise, everything in this set-up is the same as before. In particular, other than the
budget constraints none of the ﬁrst-order conditions of the household or the ﬁrm and
none of the feasibility conditions are affected by this change.
First, assume that b is high enough so that the transfer constraint is binding. Then
the equilibrium allocation is inefﬁcient. The proof proceeds along the same lines as the
proof of Proposition 7 and is hence omitted.
If τ is high enough, then the transfer constraint ceases to bind. To see this, recall
that if λs+1 > 0, from equation (7) we have
βu
0(c
o
t+1)nt > VU(nt,Ut+1)u
0(c
m
t+1).
Ceteris Paribus, the introduction of a PAYG pension system increases co
t+1 and de-
creases cm
t+1, which increases the right hand side and decreases the left hand side of
the inequality. Thus, for a large enough tax system the transfer constraint ceases to
bind. For example, if τt+1 = (1 + bt+1), the government takes all income (including
legal transfers from parents) away from children. Therefore, the parent would actu-
ally want to give more than the legal minimum, bt+1 > bt+1, to assure that the child’s
consumption is positive.
25Even though transfers can be operative if the PAYG tax is large enough (i.e., the
constraint may be irrelevant), the resulting equilibrium is nevertheless A−inefﬁcient.
A PAYG system leads to underprovision of children because the societal beneﬁt from
more children (namely a larger pension payment) is not taken into account when par-
ents make fertility choices. To see this, combine the budget constraints in equations
(14) and (15) to get
c
o
t+1 + nt(c
m
t+1 + θtnt+1 + st+2 − wt+1 + τt+1wt+1) ≤ rt+1st+1 + Tt+1
It is immediately apparent that the “lump-sum” tax on children, τt+1, is distortionary
to the parent: the more children he/she has, the more taxes his/her dynasty pays. That
is, parents do not internalize that children are future contributors to the social security
system, Tt+1, and therefore donot produce the efﬁcient number of children.26 Formally,
we have:
Proposition 15 Any equilibrium allocation, z, with a PAYG system is A−inefﬁcient.
Proof. The proof when the transfer constraint is binding is very similar to the proof
of Proposition 7 and hence omitted. The case of the non-binding constraint is more
surprising. Such an equilibrium allocation can be A−dominated as follows. Consider
some generation s and add ￿ mass of children to this generation. Speciﬁcally, consider
an alternative allocation ˜ z deﬁned as follows: ˜ ns = ns + ￿, ˜ cm
s = cm
s − ￿θ, ˜ co
s = co
s + (τ −
bs+1)ws+1￿. To assure feasibility, the additional ￿ mass of newborn children consume
the following when middle aged:
˜ c
m
n =
F(ss+1, ˜ ns) − F(ss+1,ns)
￿
− ss+2 − θs+1ns+1 − (τ − bs+1)
Everyone else (any generation other than s and also the original children of generation
s) consume exactly the same as in the original allocation. It is left to show that the
life-time utility for generation s increases in ￿ for small ￿.
The utility function of generation s as a function of ￿ is:
U(￿) ≡ u(˜ c
m
s ) + βu(˜ c
o
s+1) + V
 
˜ ns,
 
ns ˜ Us+1 + ￿˜ Un(￿)
ns + ￿
!!
26See Boldrin, De Nardi, and Jones (2005), p. 40, who discuss the failure of Ricardian equivalence in a
similar context. However, they do not analyze efﬁciency.
26Plugging in for the allocation ˜ z, the utility is:
U(￿) ≡ u(c
m
s −￿θ)+βu(c
o
s+1+(τ −bs+1)ws+1￿)+V
￿
ns + ￿,Us+1 −
￿
u(˜ cm
n ) − u(cm
s+1)
ns + ￿
￿￿
Taking the derivative w.r.t. ￿ and evaluating at ￿ = 0 and simplifying the expression
becomes
∂U(￿)
∂￿
￿ ￿
￿=0 = −u
0(c
m
s )θ + βu
0(c
o
s+1)(τ − bs+1)ws+1 + Vn(ns,Us+1).
Note that from the FOCs we have:
Vn(ns,Us+1) = u
0(c
m
s )θt + βu
0(c
o
s+1)bs+1ws+1.
Using the FOC to eliminate terms, we have
∂U(￿)
∂￿
￿ ￿
￿=0 = βu0(co
s+1)τ. This expression is
positive if and only if τ > 0.
Finally, no other generation is worse off. Hence, this allocation is A−superior,
which completes the proof.
This result is in contrast with the exogenous fertility dynastic OLG literature, start-
ing with Barro (1974) and followed by Carmichael (1982), Burbidge (1983), Abel (1987)
and others, where operative bequests or transfers are a sufﬁcient condition for opti-
mality or Pareto efﬁciency. The basic problem with a standard PAYG system is that the
costs and beneﬁts of producing children remain unaligned.
5.2 Fertility dependent PAYG pensions
The obvious way to align the cost and beneﬁts of having children is to make the pen-
sion system fertility dependent (FDPAYG), the focus of this section.27 Since parents are
altruistic in our setup, FDPAYG also generates an increase in the desired transfer. If
the FDPAYG system is large enough, the allocation of consumption levels is the same
as in the case where parents have full property rights. Thus, FDPAYG can be used to
implement an A−efﬁcient allocation. Interestingly, in the spirit of this result, several
countries have now made provisions for time spent raising children to count towards
27Eckstein and Wolpin (1985), Abio, Mahieu, and Patxot (2004), Lang (2005) and Conde-Ruiz,
Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas (2010) also point out that a fertility-dependent social security system is
optimal. In contrast to our analysis, their results are derived in a model without altruism. Moreover, as
mentioned before, the optimality concepts used differ from ours. Finally, property rights are assumed
to lie with children throughout their analysis.
27pension entitlements. In France, for example, a child supplement of 10% is added to
social security beneﬁts if the person raised at least three children.28
Asbefore, the government taxesthe middleaged atrate τt and givesthe proceeds as
a fertility dependent pension, Tt(nt−1) ≡ nt−1τtwt, to the old. That is, the parent knows
that an increase in her own fertility affects her pension payment when old. Hence, the
budget constraints now are:
c
m
t + θtnt + st+1 ≤ wt(1 + bt − τt)
c
o
t+1 + bt+1wt+1nt ≤ rt+1st+1 + Tt+1(nt)
Again, the FDPAYG system requires that the government balances its budget:
Tt+1(nt) = ntτt+1wt+1.
To see why a large enough FDPAYG system leads to an A−efﬁcient allocation, con-
sider the second budget constraint using the functional form for Tt(nt−1):
c
o
t+1 + (bt+1 − τt+1)wt+1nt ≤ rt+1st+1
It is immediately apparent that private and government intergenerational transfers ap-
pear in exactly the same way. Therefore, whenever the transfer constraint is binding,
by choosing a high enough tax rate, the government can undo the effect of the transfer
constraint and therefore implement an A−efﬁcient allocation. The following proposi-
tion shows this formally.
Proposition 16 If τ is large enough, the equilibrium allocation with FDPAYG is A−efﬁcient.
Proof. We use the following change of variables. For all t, let˜ bt = bt−τt and˜ bt = bt−τt.
Then the household problem with FDPAYG is equivalent to maximizing (3) subject to
c
m
t + θtnt + st+1 ≤ wt(1 +˜ bt)
c
o
t+1 +˜ bt+1 ≤ rt+1st+1
˜ bt+1 ≥ ˜ bt+1
c
m
t ,c
o
t+1,nt ≥ 0
This is equivalent to the problem without FDPAYG. For all t, let b∗
t be the transfer cho-
sen in a world without taxes and with bt = −1. By setting τt ≥ bt − b∗
t for all t, we have
28Many other European countries have similar provisions, see Social Security Administration (2004).
28˜ bt ≤ b∗
t for all t. Hence, the minimum transfer constraint above is not binding. There-
fore, the equilibrium allocation is the same as the unconstrained equilibrium allocation
without FDPAYG. By Proposition 6 this equilibrium allocation is A−efﬁcient.
What happens here is that rather than parents taking from their own children, the
government taxes all children and then allocates funds to the old taking the number of
children into account.
Note that any FDPAYG system involving large enough transfers implements the
same allocation. The parent will simply undo the government transfers by making
larger private transfers. Thus, there is no unique “optimal tax,” but an entire range
of large enough FDPAYG taxes that implement the same A−efﬁcient allocation. Note
that this result is different from Eckstein and Wolpin (1985), Abio, Mahieu, and Patxot
(2004), Lang (2005) and Conde-Ruiz, Gim´ enez, and P´ erez-Nievas (2010), who all ﬁnd a
unique optimal fertility dependent tax level in related contexts but without altruism.29
This result speaks to the current policy debate that blames low fertility rates for the
insolvency of the standard PAYG systems around the western world. While a social
security system may have seemed like the obvious solution to old age poverty in a
world where children were no longer obliged to look after their parents, it created
inefﬁcient distortions of fertility decisions.
5.3 Fertility subsidies and government debt
Another pronatalist policy that is seen to varying degrees in many countries are fer-
tility subsidies. For example, many countries have tax deductions for children. Some
countries also give a one-time subsidy for the birth of each child. For instance, the
Russian government pays 4,500 Rubles (≈US$ 130) for the birth of each child. Simi-
larly, several cantons in Switzerland and some cities in Italy pay large birth grants.30
We now show that in the context of our model, fertility subsidies give an incentive to
increase child-bearing and, if set at a high enough level, can lead to efﬁcient fertility
choices. In particular, we show that the unconstrained equilibrium allocation can be
implemented through a policy that subsidizes fertility and ﬁnances these subsidies by
issuing debt. The debt is then repaid by taxing the next generation, i.e., the children, in
a lump-sum fashion a period later.
29Note that the allocation resulting from a large enough FDPAYG system is not the only efﬁcient
allocation. It is also not A−superior to the allocation where parents are constrained and taxes are zero
because, except for the initial old, every subsequent generation may be worse off.
30See Social Security Administration (2004) for details of such policies in European countries.
29Let τs
t be the per child subsidy a parent receives and τd
t a labor income tax rate on
all young people. Let dt+1 be per middle-aged person debt issued by the government.
c
m
t + θtnt + st+1 + dt+1 ≤ wt(1 + bt − τ
d
t ) + τ
s
t nt
c
o
t+1 + bt+1wt+1nt ≤ rt+1(st+1 + dt+1)
Government budget balance (per old person) requires that
nt−1(dt+1 + τ
d
t wt) = rtdt + τ
s
t ntnt−1
holds in all periods.
Proposition 17 Set τs
t = τt+1
wt+1
rt+1 and set τd
t = τt where τt are the taxes speciﬁed for the
FDPAYG pension. Then, the equilibrium allocation with fertility subsidies and government
debt is the same as under FDPAYG. Hence if τs
t and τd
t are large enough, the equilibrium
allocation is A−efﬁcient.
Proof. Combining the budget constraint when young and old by substituting out
(st+1 + dt+1), it is straightforward to see that the household’s budget set in period t
with fertility subsidies and government debt (FSGD) is the same as for the FDPAYG
pension. Hence, the chosen consumption, fertility and transfer allocation is the same
in the two problems. Further, under FDPAYG, households receive τt+1ntwt+1 when old
while they receive τs
t nt when young under FSGD. These are equal in present value.
To achieve the same consumption allocation in the two periods, households have to
save τs
t nt more in FSGD than FDPAYG. If the government issues debt dt+1 = τs
t nt, then
the government budget constraint holds every period and the government debt is ex-
actly offset by the difference in private savings. Hence, the equilibrium capital stock
does not change. Therefore, for large enough fertility subsidies, the same A−efﬁcient
allocation can be implemented as an equilibrium outcome.
Insum, fertility subsidiestogether with taxeson thenextgeneration to ﬁnancethese
subsidies is identical, in our model, to allowing parents to leave negative bequests to
their own children. In a more complicated model the two policies might not be exactly
identical. In fact, fertility subsidies might be more desirable. For example in a world
with uncertainty about the type (e.g., labor productivity) of one’s own children, a fer-
tility subsidy effectively offers insurance against low quality children. Such insurance
is not offered by simply allowing parents to tap into their own children’s income.
306 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the effects of various degrees of parental control over chil-
dren’s labor income. We do this in the context of an OLG model with endogenous fer-
tility where parents are altruistic towards children. We show that when parents don’t
have enough property rights, the costs and beneﬁts of having children are not aligned,
which leads to inefﬁciently low fertility. We show that the allocation of property rights
also matters for more conventional efﬁciency concepts. For example, dynamic inefﬁ-
ciencies leading to the overaccumulation of capital are present only when people do
not have enough property rights over their children. In addition, when fertility is en-
dogenous, there is also potential underaccumulation of people. Property rights also
matter for equilibrium efﬁciency in endogenous fertility models without altruism. In-
creasing the degree of altruism raises the threshold level of property rights beyond
which these different types of inefﬁciencies occur.
We also show how property rights over children interact with other intergenera-
tional policies. We show that a standard PAYG system will not lead to an A−efﬁcient
allocation because even though taxes when middle-aged are lump-sum to children,
they are distortionary for the parent and hence distort the fertility decision. We there-
fore examine alternative pension systems, in particular one where pension payments
are a function of fertility choices, as well as fertility subsidies and government debt.
Both systems are able to implement an A−efﬁcient allocation.
The paper points to several avenues for future work. First, it would be interesting
to explore the positive implications of shifts in property rights over time. In particular,
one would like to know to what extent historical changes in the allocation of property
rights (from parents to children) have contributed to the demographic transition. This
is a novel mechanism that hasn’t been analyzed in the literature so far. While plausible,
its historical relevance can only be assessed through a serious quantitative analysis.
A second positive avenue to pursue would be to analyze the importance of prop-
erty rights for differential fertility. The set-up could be easily extended to to allow for
heterogeneity. Constraints on transfers are likely to be binding only for some families.
Introducing heterogeneity and analyzing the importance of legal changes for changes
in differential fertility would be very interesting.31
Finally, in this paper, we take the shift in property rights as given and explore its
consequences. Yet, a big open question is why laws shifting property rights from par-
31See De la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004) for the importance of differential fertility for growth.
31ents to children were introduced. At least two potential answers come to mind. One
would be that legal constraints shifted for political economy reasons (e.g., that a ma-
jority of people voted for children’s rights due to increased longevity, for example).
Alternatively, the reason behind changes in de-facto ownership may have been driven
by technological changes. For example, the change from an agricultural rural society
to an industrialized urban society may have brought a change in the de facto control
parents have over their children. We leave this investigation to future research.
32A Appendix
A.1 Dynastic problem in aggregates
The constraint set in (2) is not convex in general. This is because n multiplies b in the
budget constraint when old and both are choice variables. Therefore, the ﬁrst-order
conditions of this problem, while necessary, are not sufﬁcient for an optimum. In-
stead of using second-order conditions to characterize the solution, one way to circum-
vent this problem is to follow Alvarez (1999) and to write the utility and constraints in
terms of dynasty aggregates. This formulation is technically convenient in the proof of
Proposition 14 and allows us to derive simple parameter conditions for the problem to
be well deﬁned when functional forms assumptions are made (see below).
That is, we can rewrite the utility of generation s as
Us = Ω
￿￿
N
m
s,t+1
￿∞
t=s ,
￿
C
m
s,t,C
o
s,t+1
￿∞
t=s
￿
(16)
where Nm
s,t = Π
t−1
k=snk denotes the number of middle aged descendants of generation
s in period t, Cm
s,t = Nm
s,tcm
t denotes total consumption of middle aged descendants of
generation s in period t and Co
s,t+1 = Nm
s,tco
t+1 denotes total consumption of old de-
scendants of generation s in period t + 1. Similarly, the constraints can be rewritten
as:
C
m
s,t + θtN
m
s,t+1 + Ss,t+1 ≤ N
m
s,twt + Bs,twt
C
o
s,t+1 + Bs,t+1wt+1 ≤ rt+1Ss,t+1
Bs,t+1 ≥ N
m
s,t+1bt+1
C
m
s,t,C
o
s,t+1,N
m
s,t+1,Ss,t+1 ≥ 0
(17)
where Ss,t+1 = Nm
s,tst+1 and Bs,t = Nm
s,tbt. Since the constraint set written in aggre-
gates is convex, making the necessary monotonicity and concavity assumptions on Ω
ensures that the ﬁrst-order conditions in aggregates are sufﬁcient for an optimum us-
ing standard results. In particular, we assume that to ensure that ﬁrst-order conditions
are necessary and sufﬁcient we utility is bounded and strictly increasing and strictly
concave in all its arguments, {Nm
s,t+1,Cm
s,t,Co
s,t+1}∞
t=s.
33A.1.1 Utility speciﬁcations in aggregates
For the utility speciﬁcations introduced in Section 3.3, the expressions in (12) can be
expressed in aggregates as follows. Assuming u(x) =
x1−σ
1−σ and g(x) = x1−ε, we get:
RB Us =
∞ X
t=s
ζ
t(N
m
s,t)
σ−1
￿
(Cm
t )1−σ + β(Co
t+1)1−σ + γ(Nm
s,t+1)1−σ
1 − σ
￿
BB Us =
∞ X
t=s
ζ
t(N
m
t )
σ−ε
￿
(Cm
t )1−σ + β(Co
t+1)1−σ
1 − σ
￿ (18)
which are the functions corresponding to Ω in equation 16.
Thus, the problem can be interpreted as the middle-aged adult in period s choos-
ing
￿
Cm
s,t,Co
s,t+1,Nm
s,t+1,Ss,t+1,Bs,t+1
￿∞
t=s to maximize Us in equation (18) subject to the
constraints in (17) for all t ≥ s.
To ensure that utility is bounded, we assume
ζ < 1. (19)
Further, to ensure that ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary and sufﬁcient we as-
sume that the utility is strictly increasing and strictly concave in all its arguments,
{Nm
s,t+1,Cm
s,t,Co
s,t+1}∞
t=s. Some of these conditions are useful in comparing the two spec-
iﬁcations.
In particular, for utility to be strictly increasing in Nm
s,t in the RB−altruism, the
condition boils down to:
RB. γu
0(nt) > ζ
￿
u0(cm
t+1)cm
t+1 + βu0(co
t+2)co
t+2 + γu0(nt+1)nt+1
￿
nt
. (20)
This condition says that the direct utility beneﬁt has to be strictly larger than the indi-
rect utility cost of diluting per generation consumption and fertility one period later.
With logarithmic utility, this condition boils down to:
RB(log). γ >
ζ(1+β)
1−ζ . (21)
Following Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010), there are three sets of joint parameter
restrictions that ensure that utility satisﬁes the desired monotonicity and concavity
34properties for BB−type altruism:
BB.1 0 < ε < σ < 1;
BB.2 1 < σ < ε;
BB.3 1 − ε = δ(1 − σ) for some δ > 1 and σ → 1.
(22)
In the last case, utility is separable and logarithmic and hence equivalent to the RB
speciﬁcation with logarithmic utility with γ ≡
δζ(1+β)
1−ζ . Since δ > 1, condition (21) is
satisﬁed.32
A.1.2 First-order conditions in aggregates
Let Ωx be the partial derivatives of Ω with respect to x. Let λB,t+1 be the Lagrange
multiplier on the transfer ﬂoor in (17). The ﬁrst-order conditions for the problem in
aggregates are given by
ΩCm
s,t = ΩCo
s,t+1rt+1 (23)
ΩNm
s,t+1 = ΩCm
s,tθt − ΩCo
s,t+1wt+1 + λB,t+1bt+1 (24)
ΩCo
s,t+1 = ΩCm
s,t+1 +
λB,t+1
wt+1
(25)
A.2 Proofs of results in Section 4.2
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 9
We closely follow the standard proof (see for example de la Croix and Michel (2002,
Chapter 2). If r < n, the economy is in overaccumulation and aggregate output can
be increased by saving less, holding population constant. Whether an increase in ag-
gregate output translates into a Pareto improvement depends on the utility function.
Our utility for generation s differs from the standard one in two ways. (1) Positive
altruism: Earlier generations care about the utility of later generations. (2) Utility from
fertility: Since fertility cannot be changed in a Pareto improvement, these terms enter
as additive/multiplicative constants and can therefore be ignored. Therefore, an in-
crease in aggregate output can always be translated into a Pareto improvement in this
set up. Conversely, if r ≥ n, then the economy is either at the golden rule or suffers
from underaccumulation. Therefore, holding fertility constant, consumption cannot be
32Details on the necessary utility transformations that lead to this result are available upon request.
35increased for some generation without decreasing it for another. Unlike the standard
OLG model, altruism from parents to children implies that there may still be room for
welfare improvement by decreasing one generation’s consumption and increasing it
for a later generation. If this was a welfare improvement for the early generation, they
would have made higher transfers to the later generation in equilibrium. A contradic-
tion.
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 10
This result follows directly from equations (5) and (7), together with Propositions 6 and
7 that state that the equilibrium is inefﬁcient if and only if the constraint is binding.
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 11
To show that r > n is necessary, note that the same allocation (with ﬁxed popula-
tion) that Pareto dominates a stationary equilibrium with r < n in Lemma 9 also
A−dominates the equilibrium allocation.
Toshowthatr > nisnotsufﬁcient, notethatatb = b∗ wehaver > nbynecessity. By
continuity, there exists b > b∗ such that r > n in the resulting constrained equilibrium
allocation. This together with Proposition 7 proves the result.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 14
Consider the ﬁrst-order conditions in equations (23) to (25). If the equilibrium is un-
constrained, then λB,t+1 = 0. Substituting equations (23) and (25) into equation (24),
we get:
ΩNm
s,t+1 = ΩCo
s,t+1(rt+1θt − wt+1).
Since ΩNm
s,t+1 > 0 by assumption, we have that rt+1θt > wt+1 in an unconstrained equi-
librium. By Proposition 6, it follows that rt+1θt > wt+1 is necessary for A−efﬁciency.
To show that the condition is not sufﬁcient, realize that for b = b∗ we have rθ > w
by necessity. By continuity, there exists b > b∗ such that rθ > w. This together with
Proposition 7 proves the result.
Note: Only in the special case where ΩNm = 0, i.e. when the direct utility beneﬁt
andindirectutility cost ofpopulation cancelout, total population andaggregate capital
are pure investment goods to produce aggregate consumption, and the rate of return
condition requires rθ = w at any A−efﬁcient allocation.
36A.3 Closed form solution for a special case
Here we explicitly derive a closed form solution for the special case of logarithmic
utility together with a Cobb-Douglas production function, F(Kt,Lt) = AKα
t L
1−α
t , with
α ∈ (0,1).
First, suppose bt = −1 for all t. Then altruism implies that no generation is con-
strained. Inthiscase, the steadystate capital-laborratio, fertilityandtransfersaregivenby:
k
∗ =
αθ(β + ζ(1 + β + γ))
β(1 − α) + γ − αζ (1 + γ + β)
(26)
n
∗ = ζAα
￿
β(1 − α) + γ − αζ (1 + γ + β)
αθ(β + ζ(1 + β + γ))
￿1−α
(27)
b
∗ =
[ζθα(1 + β + γ) − (1 − α)k∗γ]
k∗(1 − α)(γ − ζ (1 + γ + β))
(28)
Our parameter restriction (21) guarantees that all variables are strictly positive in equi-
librium. Note thattheoptimal transfermaywellbenegative. Weﬁndthatb∗ isnegative
if and only if
β(1 − α) > αζ (1 + γ + β). (29)
To see this, note that b∗ is negative if and only if
θαζ(1 + β + γ) < (1 − α)k
∗γ.
Using equation (26) and rearranging yields condition (29). The condition is compatible
with our parameter restriction (21) as long as ζ <
β
α+β, i.e., as long as parents are not
too altruistic.
Condition (29) shows that parents want to take resources from children if the labor
share in output is sufﬁciently high and if parents value their children’s utility little
enough relative to their own old age consumption. This shows that even altruistic
parents want to take resources away from their children under certain circumstances.
It also suggests that children are not only a consumption good in this model, but also
an investment good.
Second, consider b such that b∗ < b. In this case, the parent chooses ˆ b = b and the
37steady state capital-labor ratio and fertility are given by:
ˆ k =
αβθ
αγ − (β + γ)(1 − α)b
(30)
ˆ n =
γAα(1 − α)ˆ kα(1 + b)
(1 + β + γ)
￿
αθ + b(1 − α)ˆ k
￿ (31)
For efﬁciency results in Section 4, it is useful to deﬁne the following two thresholds.
Let bP be the transfer constraint such that ˆ n = ˆ r and let bM be the transfer constraint
such that ˆ w = θˆ r. Using the equations above, we can derive closed form solutions for
bP and bM:
bP =
α(1 + 2β + γ) − β
(1 − α)(1 + 2β + γ)
(32)
bM =
γα − β(1 − α)
(1 − α)(β + γ)
(33)
Now, from the solution for ˆ k, the maximal b for which a steady state equilibrium
exists is b
max =
γα
(1−α)(β+γ). It is straightforward to see that bP < b
max if and only if
(1 + 2β + γ)α < 1. Since this conditions does not contradict the parameter restrictions
needed for the model to be well deﬁned—conditions (21) and (19)—a low enough α
is sufﬁcient to guarantee the existence of bP. Clearly, bM < b
max is always true for
admissible parameters.
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